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Performance Legitimacy, State
Autonomy and China’s Economic
Miracle
HONGXING YANG and DINGXIN ZHAO*
Theories that explain post-Mao China’s economic success tend to attribute it to one or several
‘successful’ policies or institutions of the Chinese government, or to account for the success
from economic perspectives. This article argues that the success of the Chinese economy
relies not just on the Chinese state’s economic policy but also on its social policies. Moreover,
China’s economic success does not merely lie in the effectiveness of any single economic or
social policy or institution, but also in the state’s capacity to make a policy shift when it faces
the negative unintended consequences of its earlier policies. The Chinese state is compelled
to make policy shifts quickly because performance constitutes the primary base of its
legitimacy, and the Chinese state is able to make policy shifts because it enjoys a high level of
autonomy inherited from China’s past. China’s economic development follows no fixed
policies and relies on no stable institutions, and there is no ‘China model’ or ‘Beijing
consensus’ that can be constructed to explain its success.
The Chinese economy has grown 9.7% annually since 1978,1 and the size of China’s
GDP has jumped from eighth place in the world in 1980 to second place in 2010.
After the Second World War, no other states except for the East Asian ‘four small
dragons’ have sustained such a high speed of development for so long. In comparison
with the four small dragons, China has a much larger population and huge regional
disparity in geography, resources and human capital. We would think that, in
comparison with the four small dragons, it would be much harder for China to
achieve a durable development, but China did. As of today, the living standard of the
Chinese in coastal regions has already reached or even surpassed the level of many
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developed nations, and China is also predicted to be able to maintain high-speed
development for many years to come.2 Back in the early 1990s, many countries
adopted neoliberal policies, but today their experiences have all become hard lessons.
Yet, the Chinese economy has developed quickly under an authoritarian regime with
a strong capacity in directing economic activities. The Chinese way of achieving
economic success has, thus, been labeled as the ‘China model’ or ‘Beijing
consensus’, and has attracted great attention from both intellectuals and policymakers
and inspired heated debates.3
Theories that explain China’s successful development vary greatly, but they
attribute the success to good government policies and institutional designs. They
differ only in identifying specific government policies or institutional designs that
have actually contributed to China’s success. Scholars who favor neoliberal
economic policies believe that China’s success is largely thanks to the market-
oriented reform policies, especially the establishment of a price mechanism and
promotion of property rights. Yet, state-centered theorists argue that China has had a
successful economic development because of the autonomy that the Chinese state has
enjoyed, which allows Chinese leaders to adopt policies that may not be in line with
market principles but are conducive to sustainable development.
This article argues that, while the Chinese government has adopted many policies
aimed at improving its economic performance, these policies have at the same time
also generated significant unintended consequences inimical to the economy’s long-
term performance. What is behind China’s economic success is not specific state
policies, but the autonomy of the Chinese state as well as the existence of societal
pressure that has effectively checked the state power. The autonomy allows the state
to adjust its policies and implement new policies and institutional designs once the
economy faces problems, while the societal pressure compels the state to use its
autonomy prudently, so as not to make the disastrous mistakes that the Chinese state
repeatedly made during Mao’s time. The Chinese state derives its autonomy from
China’s historical legacies, and the autonomy is constrained by the state’s
performance-based legitimacy. We refer to this particular kind of autonomy as
‘bounded autonomy’ and argue that the combination of state autonomy and
performance legitimacy is the key to China’s economic success.
2. Robert Fogel, ‘Why China’s economy will grow to $123 trillion by 2040?’, Foreign Policy, (4 January 2010);
Justin Yifu Lin, ‘Zhongguo Jingji Baochi 20 Nian Gaosu Zengzhang Mei Wenti’ [‘China has no problem to keep
high-speed economic growth in the coming 20 years’], Special Article in Phoenix Website, (18 July 2011).
3. Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power (London: The
Foreign Policy Centre, 2004); Minglu Chen and David S. G. Goodman, ‘The China model: one country, six authors’,
Journal of Contemporary China 21(73), (2012), pp. 169–185; Suisheng Zhao, ‘The China model: can it replace the
Western model of modernization?’, Journal of Contemporary China 19(65), (2010), pp. 419–436; Barry Naughton,
‘China’s distinctive system: can it be a model for others?’, Journal of Contemporary China 19(65), (2010), pp. 437–
460; Scott Kennedy, ‘The myth of the Beijing consensus’, Journal of Contemporary China 19(65), (2010), pp. 461–
477; Shaoguang Wang, ‘Xuexi Jizhi, Shiying Nengli yu Zhongguo Moshi’ [‘Learning mechanism, adaptation
capability and “China model”’], Kaifang Shidai [Open Times ] 7, (2009), pp. 36–40; Yongnian Zheng, Zhongguo
Moshi: Jingyan yu Kunju [The China Model: Experience and Dilemma ] (Hongzhou: Zhejiang People’s Press, 2010);
Xueliang Ding, Bianlun ‘Zhongguo Moshi’ [Debates on ‘The China Model’ ] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic
Press, 2011); Yasheng Huang, ‘Zhongguo Moshi’ Daodi You Duo Dute [How Unique is the ‘China Model’ in the
End? ] (Beijing: Zhongxin Press, 2011).
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This article first provides a critical assessment on the current theories that explain
China’s success and summarizes our major argument. It then elaborates two key
terms used in this article—state legitimacy and bounded autonomy. Finally, after a
brief discussion of China’s positive legacies conducive to current economic success,
we present an account on the actual process of China’s reform based on the
theoretical framework of this article.
Theoretical background
Theories that explain China’s economic success fall between two opposite
traditions—the neoliberal and the state-centered argument. Neoliberals contend
that China has had a successful economic development because it has embraced
market-oriented reforms,4 and established institutions (i.e. property rights, rule of law
and the freedom of contract) vital for a healthy economy.5 It is worth noting that
neoliberals also call for a strong state, which is needed to install the price mechanism,
property rights and the rule of law in places where such institutions are absent.
A strong state is also needed to push forward reforms against the interest of powerful
social groups.6
The state-centered theorists are not necessarily against the market. Yet, to them,
the key to economic success lies in the existence of a ‘developmental state’, that is, a
state with a strong capacity to penetrate society and great autonomy to free itself from
powerful social groups.7 Along these lines, Yao argues that China has successful
development because the government can free itself from the control of the major
interest groups.8 Oi and Walder develop the concepts of ‘local state corporatism’ and
‘local governments as industrial firms’, and argue that Chinese local governments’
all-round support to local industries is the key to economic success.9 Zhou argues that
the central government’s GDP-centered evaluation of official performance has
compelled its cadres to develop the local economy, and that China’s success is
attributable not to economic incentive but to political incentive.10
4. Jinglian Wu, Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform (Mason, OH: Thomson/South-
Western, 2005).
5. Yushi Mao, ‘Zhongguo Gaige de Zhiduguan’ [‘The institutional perspective of China’s reform’], Gaige yu
Zhanlve [Reform & Strategy ] 6, (1994), pp. 13–17; Hong Sheng, ‘Guanyu Zhongguo Shichanghua Gaige de Guodu
Guocheng de Yanjiu’ [‘Research on the transitional process of China’s market-oriented reform’], Jingji Yanjiu
[Economic Research Journal ] 1, (1996), pp. 69–81; Weiying Zhang, ‘Cong Xiandai Qiye Lilun Kan Zhongguo
Guoyou Qiye de Gaige’ [‘China’s state-owned enterprises’ reform from the perspective of theories of the firm’],
Gaige yu Zhanlve [Reform & Strategy ] 6, (1994), pp. 18–20.
6. Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981).
7. Chalmers A. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant South Korea and Late
Industrialization (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market:
Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1990); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1995).
8. Yang Yao, ‘Zhongxing Zhengfu yu Zhongguo de Jingji Qiji’ [‘The neutral state and China’s economic
miracle’], Twenty-First Century Review 107, (June 2008), pp. 15–25.
9. Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1999); Andrew Walder, ‘Local governments as industrial firms: an organizational analysis of
China’s transitional economy’, American Journal of Sociology 101(2), (1995), pp. 263–301.
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Scholars also explain China’s economic development by combining both the
neoliberal and state-centered perspectives. Qian and Shirk attribute China’s
economic success to an institutional arrangement that they label as ‘fiscal federation’.
They argue: the fiscal responsibility system installed in the 1980s allowed local
governments to retain the revenues beyond a predetermined quota; the local officials
thus became strongly motivated in promoting the local economy.11 Cheung argues
that the competition among county-level governments is an important feature in
China, and the key to China’s success.12
The above theories have one thing in common, that is, they all attribute China’s
economic success to state policies or institutional designs. They differ only on the
issue of which state policy or intervention is the key. I must stress that each of the
above theories has certain validity. Who can deny that a price mechanism and
institutions that support it have been crucial for a sustainable economic development?
Yet, once we hold too strong a faith on this neoliberal logic, we would find it hard to
explain the following reality: in China, government manipulation of the market is
commonplace, and transaction costs are always high. China’s market-oriented reform
does not weaken the state intervention into the economy but only change the forms of
intervention. What makes it ironic is the co-existence of a high-speed growth rate and
a high level of state intervention, which is contradictory to the neoliberal principles.
Those theories that stress the role of the Chinese state in economic development also
have their strengths. Who can deny the significant roles that some government
policies (e.g. the open-door for foreign ideas and investment, the establishment of a
price mechanism) and the government’s capacity to implement these policies have
played in China’s economic success? Who can say no to the argument that some
institutions that have been put in place by China’s central government (such as the
fiscal responsibility system, cadre assessment system and leadership responsibility
system) have encouraged or compelled China’s local governments to promote the
economy, and are playing or have played certain positive roles in development? On
the other hand, these scholars have neglected to note that most reform measures in
China have ended in failure, and even the successful ones have given rise to serious
unintended consequences detrimental to further economic success.13 The question,
then, is: why can the Chinese economy still grow at a high speed after a certain policy
that some scholars have identified as the key to the economic success is abandoned by
the Chinese government?
Footnote 9 continued
10. Li-An Zhou, ‘Zhongguo Difang Guanyuan de Jinsheng Jinbiaosai Moshi Yanjiu’ [‘Governing China’s local
officials: an analysis of promotion tournament model’], Economic Research Journal 7, (2007), pp. 36–50.
11. Yingyi Qian, Gabriella Montinola and Barry Weingast, ‘Federalism, Chinese style: the political basis for
economic success in China’, World Politics 48, (1995), pp. 50–81; Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic
Reform in China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).
12. Steven N. S. Cheung, Zhongguo de Jingji Zhidu [The Economic System of China ] (Beijing: Zhongxin Press,
2009).
13. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s, labor intensive foreign companies in Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang
absorbed a huge amount of surplus labor and contributed to China’s economic development, but now these industries
are the source of pollution, unemployment, China’s trade war with the US and frequent workers’ protests. Also, when
the Chinese government pushed forward the housing reform in 1998, its original intention was to improve urban
Chinese’s living conditions. Yet, in a few years, while housing conditions have indeed hugely improved, Chinese can
no longer buy an apartment at affordable prices.
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We argue that China’s economic success never lies in any of the policies that many
scholars regard as key to economic success, but in the government’s autonomy and
capacity to free itself from the ideological restrictions and interest group politics and
to implement new policies when negative consequences of earlier policies loom
large. Our argument is close to Yang Yao’s theory because we both stress the role of
state autonomy in economic development.14 Yet, Yao’s theory places no importance
on the frequent changes of government policies in China’s economic success. It also
gives no clue as to why the Chinese government is able to maintain such autonomy,
and why the Chinese state has not used the autonomy to bring disaster to the country.
The latter question is particularly important because history has presented ample
examples that when a regime possesses great autonomy, it is very likely to use that
autonomy in detrimental ways. The disasters that the Maoist regime brought to China
are examples of this point.
Our argument bears similarities with the Chinese government’s own explanation of
China’s economic success: namely, that the experimental/piecemeal nature of the
Chinese reform (e.g. ‘crossing the river by feeling for stones’) is the key of China’s
success. Yet, our argument and the Chinese government propaganda differ in three
crucial aspects. First, the government propaganda emphasizes only the ‘state
autonomy’ aspect of China’s success, while we stress how China’s state–society
relationships have constrained the state’s policy choices so much so that many factors
that have contributed to the economic success cannot be credited to any specific state
policies. Second, the government propaganda sees much of China’s economic
success as intended consequences of the state policy, but our article stresses
unintended consequences. Third, in our article, we stress that many historical events
that led China to success (such as the rise of the household responsibility system and
the rise of rural collective industry in the 1980s) were not even the targeted state
policies of the time, but the positive unintended consequences unleashed by some
state policies for other purposes. In other words, we are arguing that the Chinese
government often touches the wrong stones, but the societal energy generated by the
government’s moves has led to positive consequences that the government was
compelled to accept and later even motivated to take credit for it.
In explaining China’s economic success, the earlier theories have also neglected
the crucial roles that China’s ‘historical dividend’ and societal forces have played
in the success. By ‘historical dividend’, we mean some positive unintended
consequences derived from China’s past. More specifically, China has a strong state
tradition, a tradition to base state legitimacy on good performance, and a culture that
facilitates the forging of a national identity.15 In other words, while most developing
countries needed to pass the hurdles of nation-building and state-building before
successful economic development becomes even possible, China has only economic
development as its main task. Moreover, the ultra-leftist Maoist policies, in particular
the calamitous Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) and the Cultural Revolution
14. Yao, ‘Zhongxing Zhengfu yu Zhongguo de Jingji Qiji’.
15. Performance has always been a major source of state legitimacy in China ever since the Western Zhou
Dynasty (ca. 1066–771 BCE). See Dingxin Zhao, ‘The mandate of heaven and performance legitimation in historical
and contemporary China’, American Behavioral Scientist 53(3), (2009), pp. 416–433.
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(1966–1976), led to a quick erosion of the regime’s ideological legitimacy within the
period of a single generation. By the late 1970s, while most communist veterans were
still alive, the government had to resort to market-oriented reform to survive. When
the reform started, the Chinese government still possessed a high level of autonomy
and infrastructural capacity typical of a revolutionary regime, even though it was
compelled to use its autonomy and capacity cautiously in order to retain the regime’s
eroded legitimacy.
Yet, performance-based legitimacy has the following characteristic: its promises
are too concrete and it will continuously raise the people’ expectations. In the case of
China, unsuccessful reform measures induce massive grievances, whereas successful
reforms are always accompanied by significant negative unintended consequences.
Successful reforms not only improve people’s lives, but also change how people
think and raise people’s demands. Therefore, although China has a successful
economy and Chinese lives have been improving tremendously, the pressure faced by
the Chinese government has never eased. Such pressure forces the Chinese
government to use the autonomy it possesses to implement ever newer reforms to
enhance its performance. These reforms may have fostered economic development,
but they also induce more pressure from society. The social mechanisms associated
with performance legitimacy and bounded autonomy have thus propelled a quick
economic development.
State legitimacy and autonomy
Legitimacy and autonomy are two key concepts of this article. Any state has a certain
amount of autonomy in decision making. State autonomy is first derived from some
functions (e.g. territorial defense and lawmaking) that other types of organizations
cannot effectively provide.16 Modern states also derive their autonomy from many
elements that constitute a state, such as the bureaucracy, army and police, and the
state’s capacity to monopolize certain information, materials and resources.
Autonomy is crucial for a state to adopt policies against societal interest.
However, there is no guarantee that a state will use its autonomy to benefit the
people. The Maoist state had an extremely high autonomy, but it was exactly in that
period that the state adopted policies that brought the Chinese decades of hardship.
To ensure that a state would use its autonomous power to good ends, such power must
be balanced by societal forces. Therefore, Zhao and Hall have proposed the concept
of ‘bounded autonomy’ and argued that it is most crucial for a successful economic
development.17 A state’s autonomous power can be constrained by multiple forces.
Competitive elections, separation of executive and legislative branches of the
government, elite factionalism, interest group politics, procedure-based decision
making and media freedom are the usual candidates. This article argues that the
state’s autonomous power can also be effectively constrained by the sources of state
legitimacy. The reason behind China’s success is actually a very simple one: the
16. Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
17. Dingxin Zhao and John A. Hall, ‘State power and patterns of late development’, Sociology 28(1), (1994), pp.
211–229.
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Chinese state enjoys strong autonomy and its autonomy is seriously constrained not
by various local interests but by the regime’s performance-based legitimacy.
To rule effectively, state power must be seen as legitimate by both rulers and the
ruled. Following Linz, this article defines legitimacy as ‘the belief that in spite of
shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are better than others that might
be established and therefore can demand obedience’.18 Legitimacy became a central
concept after Weber’s formulation.19 Weber believes that habit, affection and
rational calculation are three bases of human compliance. Accordingly, he proposes
three ideal-typical aspects of state legitimacy: a state enjoys traditional legitimacy
when its power is seen by the people as being inherited or always existent; a state has
charismatic legitimacy when the head of the state is perceived by the people as having
exceptional quality by virtue of some kinds of mystical experiences and personal
qualities; and finally, a state possesses legal legitimacy when its power is derived
from a set of judicial and administrative principles that bind all members of a
society.20 Weber’s classification is illuminating. However, when we apply it to
understand state power, it leads to two problems. First, Weber’s classification is
static, while any authority relationships in real life are dynamic and interactive.21
People’s understanding of state legitimacy shapes the way people interact with the
state, and such patterns of interaction will in turn shape people’s perception of
the nature and sources of state legitimacy. Second, Weber’s ideal type separates the
emotional and rational aspects of human perception, but in real life people’s
perception of state legitimacy is always a mixture of the two. For instance, in Chinese
history, the emperor was legitimized as the ‘Son of Heaven’, but if he was unable to
deliver some basic public goods such as natural disaster prevention and local security,
his rule would be seriously challenged. The same is also true for a charismatic leader.
People follow him usually out of a mix of two purposes: adoration and a hope to be
better awarded. Since Weber’s classification has neglected the dynamic aspect of
authoritative relations and isolated emotional and rational bases of authoritative
relations, it is hard to be applied in empirical analysis.
In this article, the sources of state legitimacy are not classified according to
people’s perception of state power, but by the ways in which state power can be
justified: by a commonly accepted leader selection procedure; by services that a state
provides; and by a promise to bring a better future. Accordingly, we identify legal-
electoral, ideological and performance as three bases of state legitimacy.22
A state is based on legal-electoral legitimacy when it takes laws as binding
principles for all social groups including the state elite, and when top leaders are
18. Juan J. Linz, ‘Legitimacy of democracy and socioeconomic systems’, in Mattei Dogan Boulder, ed.,
Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 65.
19. John H. Schaar, Legitimacy in the Modern State (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981); William
Connolly, ed., Legitimacy and the State (New York: New York University Press, 1984); Samuel P. Huntington, The
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
20. MaxWeber, ‘The nature of social action’, in W. G. Runciman and E. Mathews, eds,Max Weber: Selections in
Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 28.
21. Randall Collins, ‘Prediction in macro-sociology: the case of the Soviet collapse’, American Journal of
Sociology 100, (1995), pp. 1552–1593.
22. For more detailed discussion, see Zhao, ‘The mandate of heaven and performance legitimation in historical
and contemporary China’.
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popularly elected on a regular basis. Ideological legitimacy means that a state’s right
to rule is justified by a certain value system in the form of tradition, religion and
philosophy. Performance legitimacy means that a state’s right to rule is justified by its
economic and/or moral performance, and by the state’s capacity of territorial defense.
Weber’s original formulation did not include performance legitimacy. Among
Weberians, Lipset has singularly emphasized the importance of state performance to
a regime’s stability.23 Yet, he also believes that state performance should not be seen
in legitimacy terms because ‘effectiveness is primarily instrumental, legitimacy is
evaluative’. To us, evaluative process is an essential part of performance legitimacy
because people naturally judge a state’s performance in ways similar to their
assessment of state legitimacy based on the other criteria. The only difference lies in
the basis of such an evaluation. Performance legitimacy is irreducible to the other two
sources of state legitimacy.
It should be stressed that all three sources of state legitimacy that we have defined
are ideal types. No state will base its survival only on a single source. Nevertheless, in
one country at a particular time, one source of legitimacy tends to dominate, which
defines the nature of a state. This article argues that ever since the late 1970s,
performance has increasingly become the primary basis of state legitimacy, and this
nature of the Chinese state is crucial for us to understand not only China’s economic
success, but also many other aspects of Chinese society.24
Historical ‘dividend’
The rise of the nation state and capitalism defines the age of modernity.25 These two
historical processes are related in the sense that the solid foundation of the nation
state (i.e. a widely shared national identity, a modern bureaucracy and a high capacity
for the state to penetrate the society) holds the key to sustainable economic
development. If the major identities of a country are local rather than national or if the
major identity groups in a country are engaged in an uncompromising struggle, this
country will be plagued with wars and other types of conflicts. Likewise, if a state
does not have an effective bureaucracy, the policies of that state will lack consistency
and the officials will be prone to corruption. No economy is going to be successful in
this kind of situation either. In the twentieth century, when a state was unable to
develop a successful economy, it was often because that state was unable to launch a
successful nation-building project.
23. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), pp.
64–69.
24. For the most recent debates on state legitimacy in contemporary China, see Florian Schneider and Yih-Jye
Hwang, ‘The Sichuan earthquake and the heavenly mandate: legitimizing Chinese rule through disaster discourse’,
Journal of Contemporary China 23(88), (2014), DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2013.861145; Jinghan Zeng, ‘The debate
on regime legitimacy in China: bridging the wide gulf between Western and Chinese scholarship’, Journal of
Contemporary China 23(88), (2014), DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2013.861141.
25. Charles Tilly, ‘Reflections on the history of European state-making’, in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of
National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 3–83; Rudolf Braun,
‘Taxation, sociopolitical structure, and state-building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia’, in Tilly, ed., The
Formation of National States in Western Europe, pp. 243–327.
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China, however, is more blessed among the developing countries. During late
imperial China, neo-Confucian philosophy and organizations started to penetrate
Chinese society. The process homogenized the Chinese culture, which allowed
modern nationalists to construct a Han ethnicity with which most Chinese (over 92%)
identify.26 Moreover, China has a long bureaucratic tradition. In comparison with
most developing countries, the task for China to build a modern nation state is
considerably easier, or in other words, economic development is the major obstacle in
China’s modernization process. It is still not an easy task, however. Facing Japanese
aggression, China never had a real chance to focus on the economy before the end of
the Second World War. Subsequently, Mao’s radical policies led China into another
kind of disaster. It was not until after the death of Mao that China got a real chance to
launch a sustained market-oriented economic development.
Yet, even though the Maoist policies brought hardships to the Chinese, they at the
same time left several unintended consequences quite crucial for China’s recent
economic success. For instance, the Maoist self-reliance (import substitute) economic
model gave rise to an industrial system that can produce almost everything, albeit
with very poor quality; the Maoist education system failed to produce first-rate
scientists and engineers, but it prepared for China a high-quality labor force; Mao’s
village industries were totally infeasible economically, but Chinese farmers gained
firsthand knowledge of industrial technologies through practice; millions of urban
youths were sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution, but these
miserable souls brought new ideas and ways of life to rural China. The Cultural
Revolution, exactly because it was an outright disaster for the Chinese, accelerated
the decline of the Maoist ideology, fostered a shift of the primary basis of state
legitimacy from the communist ideology to economic and moral performance, and
compelled the Chinese state to embark on reform immediately after the death of Mao,
in a time when many communist veterans were still alive and the state still retained
many characteristics of a revolutionary regime. These conditions have all decisively
contributed to the regime’s political stability and have positively affected post-Mao
China’s economic development.
Recently, some Chinese neo-leftists have argued that China could have a
successful economic development largely because the sociopolitical development
of the Maoist era had laid the groundwork.27 This argument is not completely
senseless. As mentioned, many policies and practices from the Maoist era had some
positive effects on the post-Mao economic success. Nevertheless, we must be
absolutely clear that theMaoist economic model had brought hardships to the Chinese
and has no future.While some of theMaoist policies and practices had positive effects
on the current economic success, they are unintended consequences rather than goals of
the Maoist policies and practices.
26. In comparison, Russians constituted only 44% of the population in the former Soviet Union.
27. Yang Gan, ‘Zhongguo Daolu: Sanshinian yu Liushinian’ [‘The road of China, thirty years and sixty years’],
Dushu [Reading ] 6, (2007), pp. 3–13.
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Road toward economic success—an empirical account
Rise of performance legitimacy: 1978–1984
During the Maoist era, the planned-economy model was unable to provide effective
incentives for people to work harder, and the government-initiated social movements,
especially the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, brought the Chinese
economy to the verge of collapse. At the time of Mao’s death in 1976, the Chinese
were very unhappy and the government faced monumental pressures, especially from
people in urban areas.28 It is not that the rural Chinese endured less hardship during
the Cultural Revolution. Rather, in comparison with people in urban areas, especially
the costal urban Chinese, the rural Chinese at the time had much less education, lived
in scattered villages away from the political center, and knew much less of what was
happening elsewhere. They had less potential to articulate politicized grievances and
make their voices heard by the government. Before the reform started in 1978, the
urban employment situation was grim and wages had stagnated for over 20 years; 20
million urban youths who had been sent by the state to the countryside during the
Cultural Revolution desperately wanted to return home; many intellectuals and
communist veterans who had been persecuted during and before the Cultural
Revolution demanded rehabilitation.
Facing these pressures, the state restored the college entrance examination,
rehabilitated the persecuted cadres and intellectuals, loosened its control over the
media and publications, and launched the reform and open-door policy. While these
policies were embraced by the Chinese, the new problems that these policies
generated added more pressure onto the Chinese government. Briefly, once the
people got more freedom, they started to criticize the ultra-leftist policies of the
Cultural Revolution. People’s grievances were not alleviated but intensified as a
result. The open-door policy attracted a large number of overseas Chinese from
Taiwan, Hong Kong and other parts of the world. These people not only brought into
China new ways of life and ideas, but shocked their mainland relatives by their
affluence. The old state propaganda on the superiority of socialism over capitalism,
that the Chinese had tried to believe, was invalidated. By and by, more and more
Chinese lost their faith in the communist ideology, and the state was forced to
increasingly rely on performance, especially economic performance, as the
fundamental basis for its legitimacy.29
In short, while most Chinese welcomed the new policies, what the Chinese
government received in return was not praise but more and different kinds of
pressure. In late 1978, the sent-down urban youths in many parts of China put on
large-scale and sometimes violent protests demanding to return home. In 1979, some
Beijing youths and intellectuals staged the ‘Xidan Democracy Wall’ movement, and
the big-character posters that appeared on the walls turned increasingly critical
toward the regime.30 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, young writers who had
28. Maurice Meisner,Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic (New York: Free Press, 1986).
29. Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen: State–Society Relations and the 1989 Movement (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 2001).
30. Jianying Zha, Bashi Niandai Fangtanlu [Interview Records of 1980s ] (Beijing: Sanlian Publishing House,
2006).
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suffered during the Cultural Revolution initiated a highly critical ‘scar literature’
movement. Finally, in Guangdong, Chinese crossed the border and escaped to Hong
Kong on a massive scale.
Facing this situation, the Chinese state’s response was to repress the radicals (i.e.
the key leaders of the Xidan Democracy Wall movement) and placate the rest. Yet,
the state’s main thrust was on the economic reform. In this period, the Chinese
government implemented the following reforms: (1) readjusting the industrial
structure and introducing an incentive system to reward better workers; (2) introducing
various kinds of management responsibility systems to enhance the decision-making
power of the leaders in factories, universities and research institutes;31 (3) installing
the fiscal responsibility system to boost the local government’s interest in economic
development; (4) establishing four special economic zones to experiment with a
market economy; (5) legalizing small-scale private businesses; and (6) promoting the
household responsibility system in rural areas.
In China’s official and scholarly circles, most people now believe that China’s
reform started in rural areas (i.e. the household responsibility system), and was
initiated by the farmers in the poorest regions and then accepted by the government.32
This is, however, a wrong consensus. Coase and Wang’s recent study shows that,
while the household responsibility system was indeed initiated by farmers and later
legalized and promoted by the government, the Chinese reform started in the cities.33
Yet, while most early urban reform measures ended in failure, the household
responsibility system in rural areas was a great success. The success of the household
responsibility system made the Chinese government silent about China’s other early
reforms and it accepted the claim that China’s reform started in rural areas. Coase and
Wang’s finding fits our argument well: the Chinese government had to start the
reform in the cities and coastal areas because these were the regions where the
government faced increasingly serious challenges.
We would also point out that leftism still had a strong imprint on both Chinese
officials and the people in the 1980s. Among the top officials, although most of them
firmly believed that reform was the only future for China, they also inherited ways of
thinking belonging to the Maoist era. Most importantly, these officials all maintained
their faith in communism and saw the communist ideology as the foundation of state
legitimacy. In other words, the primacy of performance legitimacy was not yet firmly
established in this period. Therefore, when the top state leaders believed that their
power was seriously challenged, they always launched retaliative political
campaigns, even though those campaigns never lasted long under the reform
environment.34
31. Han Zong,Guoqi Gaige Sanshinian Qingliji [Personal Experience of Thirty Years of State-Owned Enterprises
Reform ] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2008).
32. Kate Xiao Zhou, How the Farmers Changed China: Power of the People (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1996).
33. Ronald Coase and Wang Ning, How China Became Capitalist (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
34. The anti-spiritual pollution campaign in late 1983 and the anti-bourgeoisie liberalization campaign in early
1987 are two prominent examples.
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The urban reform: 1984–1989
China’s agricultural productivity was greatly increased under the household
responsibility system. Yet, this success carried several unintended consequences.
Most importantly, when the farmers started to work hard, agricultural labor surplus
immediately became an issue. Beginning in the early 1980s, more and more farmers
migrated into cities to find jobs. These rural migrants competed with the urban youths
and millions of sent-down youths who had just returned home, but China’s state-
owned industry at the time faced over-employment and new industries popularized in
the 1990s, such as private companies, foreign companies, joint-venture companies
and service sectors, were just emerging. The rural to urban migration and the
associated unemployment became a serious problem.35
Meanwhile, the introduction of the fiscal responsibility system weakened the
central state’s taxation capacity. The market-oriented reforms induced inflation to the
Chinese who had been accustomed to a life with little inflation. On top of these, more
and more intellectuals stood up to criticize the wrong doings of the CCP (Chinese
Communist Party) during the Cultural Revolution, and the whole process induced the
rise of humanitarianism and liberalism (Chinese style) at odds with the state’s
ideological stance.
The Chinese government implemented more reforms to tackle these problems. In
1984, the state launched a series of more aggressive reforms aimed at enhancing the
productivity of the state-owned industry, which included: (1) further expanding the
managerial autonomy; (2) installing the contract worker system to break up the ‘iron
rice bowl’; (3) strengthening the fiscal responsibility system; (4) establishing a ‘dual
price system’; and (5) establishing more special economic zones in coastal regions
(14 in 1984, and Hainan Province, Zhujiang Delta and Yangtze Delta were added
in 1988).
These reform measures opened people’s minds, imbued the price mechanism in an
otherwise rigid planned economy, built up new institutions, and accumulated
experiences for the later full-scale market-oriented reforms in the 1990s. From
today’s point of view, none of these reform measures should be regarded as failures.
Back in the late 1980s, however, these reforms not only did not reach their targeted
goals, but also brought a new round of social problems. Briefly put, the dual price
system in conjunction with the greatly expanded power of the managers induced
serious official corruption, which in part triggered the outbreak of the 1989 Student
Movement and subsequently compelled the state to place ‘anti-corruption’ and ‘rule
of virtue’ at the center of the state’s legitimacy. The freer economic policies that the
special economic zones had enjoyed allowed the local people to smuggle everything
they could and sell illegally in China. Together with the rise of private business, they
allowed some poorly educated Chinese to get rich almost overnight. This aroused
widespread jealousy, especially among the intellectuals and college students who
otherwise regarded themselves as the elite and backbone of the society. Such
grievances constituted another major cause behind the 1989 Student Movement.
35. For more discussion on problems associated with the rural to urban migration, see Deng Quheng and Bjorn
Gustafsson, ‘The hukou converters—China’s lesser known rural to urban migrants’, Journal of Contemporary China,
23(88), (2014), pp. 657–679.
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Most importantly, once the government no longer controlled the price of the goods
that were in severe shortage, inflation ensued. High inflation was yet another major
cause of the 1989 Student Movement.36
China’s economy did have one shining spot, namely, the rise of rural collective
industry. Yet, this was not the result of state reform, but the unintended consequence
of the dual price system and fiscal responsibility system. When the Chinese
government implemented the dual price system, its initial intention was to allow
those state-owned industries that were able to produce more than their quotas to buy
raw materials at a higher market price. What the policymakers did not expect was that
the policy also allowed rural collective enterprises to buy market-priced raw
materials to expand their production.37 The rural collective industry expansion was
also heavily supported by the local governments because it was then the local
governments’ cash cow under the fiscal responsibility system.
The rise of rural industry has been regarded by some scholars as crucial to China’s
economic success. Yet, China as a whole was in deep crisis. By the late 1980s,
‘liberal’ ideas started to take root among more intellectuals and students. These
‘liberals’ shared a belief that successful economic development was impossible in a
country without democracy. They also condemned Deng Xiaoping’s ‘crossing the
river by feeling for stones’ style of reform and enthusiastically praised Gorbachev’s
‘new thinking’. They, thus, advocated political reforms and tried to expand their
influence in universities, and the students who were under their influence embraced
street politics. Most importantly, the grievances of different urban groups started to
converge in the late 1980s on the issues of inflation, corruption and income disparity.
Together, they triggered the rise of the 1989 Student Movement.38
The 1989 Student Movement was ended by bloody repression. Many reasons were
behind this tragic ending, but the one that was most relevant to the argument of this
article is the nature of the Chinese state. In the 1980s, those who held the highest
power in the CCP were veterans who were fighting for the revolution and still had a
deep faith in communism. Yet, these people had also suffered greatly during the
Cultural Revolution and knew that reform and open-door was the only solution for
China. From the perspective of this article, we see a great tension in the minds of
these veterans: they insisted that the regime possessed ideological legitimation, but
they all knew that only through enhancing the state’s performance, especially its
economic performance, could the regime survive. Therefore, these veterans all
supported the reform to a varying degree, but when they felt that their power was
seriously threatened, they resorted to the use of force in dealing with opposition.39
This is why the 1989 Student Movement did not end up with a regime change as had
happened in the former Soviet Union, but with a military crackdown. This is also why
the crackdown not only did not end China’s open-door policy, but also forced the
state to stage more rigorous reforms after 1992.
36. Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen, pp. 126–128.
37. Yao Yang, ‘Zhongxing Zhengfu: Dui Zhuanxingqi Zhongguo Jingji Chenggong de Yige Jieshi’ [‘The neutral
state: an explanation of China’s economic success in the transformation period’], Economic Research Journal 3,
(2009), pp. 3–13.
38. Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen.
39. Ibid., ch. 7.
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Hesitation and determination: 1989–1992
China faced tremendous pressure after 1989. Internationally, the bloody repression
was widely condemned and the Chinese government’s image hit rock bottom.
Domestically, although the repression ended the protest, the regime’s legitimacy was
also greatly eroded. China’s top leaders were caught in a dilemma: they knew that
China had to reform, but they were very afraid of losing control over the society.
To get out of the repression-induced legitimacy crisis, the state introduced military
education to university students and staged a patriotic education campaign, but such
actions only intensified the people’s fear that the state was going to bring China back
to the ultra-leftist past. In 1990, Beijing students jammed the door of TOEFL testing
centers and waited overnight just in order to register for the examination.40 The
students were worried that the state was going to end the open-door policy and that
they might no longer have the chance to leave China. They became desperate.
The top echelon of the CCP, particularly Deng Xiaoping, obviously knew the
mood of the Chinese. On 31 May 1989, or a few days before the bloody repression,
when Deng met with Li Peng and Yao Yilin, he told them that ‘The new leaders
should be new faces and give people a clear impression that they are reformers and
China has hopes under their leadership’.41 Obviously, even when the bloody
repression was about to start, Deng sill held firmly to the view that the future of the
CCP and China hinged on whether or not China would stick to the reform and open-
door policy. Therefore, even though China’s propaganda machine turned left after
1989, several important reform measures were implemented in this period, most
prominent ones being the establishment of Shanghai’s Pudong Development District
in 1990 and Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 1991, and the acquisition of
membership in the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991.
Neoliberal development: 1992–2003
In 1992, annoyed by the leftist propaganda and slow pace of reforms, Deng started his
southern China tour and made several famous speeches to call for more radical
economic reforms. Deng’s southern China tour was decisive. After the tour, top
Chinese leaders all stepped out to show support, leftist propaganda disappeared from
mainstream media, and the state seemed to have quietly abandoned the communist
ideology as the basis of state legitimacy.
Before 1992, most Chinese still had keen memories of what they had gone through
during the Cultural Revolution, and were greatly concerned that the state was going
to restore the leftist policy. Therefore, in the 1980s, whenever the Chinese detected
leftist voices in the CCP, they became very nervous. Deng’s southern China tour
brought a positive unintended consequence: seeing that the state was promoting
reforms after the 1989 Student Movement, the Chinese people somehow realized that
boosting economic performance through reform was the only viable policy choice for
the state. In a sense, Deng’s southern China tour in conjunction with the 1989 bloody
40. Ibid., p. 131.
41. Mouren Wu, Minghui Bao, Peihua Ni, Peimin Ni and Qingjia Wang, eds, Bajiu zhongguo minyun jishi [Daily
Accounts on the 1989 Democracy Movement in China ], (no publisher, 1989).
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repression, had actually enhanced people’s trust in the state, and such trust also
increased the state autonomy.
Economic reform was sped up. In 1992, China ended its tight monetary control,
deregulated most prices except for 89 products of strategic importance, and
implemented policies to encourage the development of foreign and joint venture
companies. In 1994, the state recentralized taxation by installing a new tax sharing
system. In 1995, the state legalized the bankruptcy and selling of state-owned
industries (with the exception of 500 largest enterprises of strategic importance). At
the Fourteenth Congress of the CCP held in 1992, the Chinese government
announced that the establishment of a market economy was the goal of the reform.
These policy changes triggered a wave in the early and mid-1990s, during which over
20 million government officials, professors, researchers and workers quit their state
jobs and went into private business.42
Of the new reform measures, the replacement of the fiscal responsibility system
with a tax sharing system deserves special attention. The fiscal responsibility system
in the 1980s motivated local governments to promote businesses and stimulated the
rise of rural collective industry. At the same time, it also carried negative unintended
consequences. Namely, as the local economy quickly developed, the fixed tax deals
under the fiscal responsibility system allowed the local governments to retain an
increasingly larger portion of the revenues, and the central state became increasingly
poor and had to borrow money from local governments to function. This problem
eventually prompted the central state to abolish the fiscal responsibility system and
replace it with a tax sharing system, which allowed the central state to take a much
bigger share of the local revenue.
Some scholars argue that the fiscal responsibility system was crucial to China’s
economic success. Yet, the Chinese economy has gained greater momentum after the
fiscal responsibility system was ended in 1994. We argue that the fiscal responsibility
system had its positive side and unintended consequences, as does the new tax
sharing system. China’s economic success never hinges on any one of the state
policies, but on the state’s autonomy to free itself from the control of vested interests
to implement new reforms when the side effects of old policies loom large. With
regard to the change of fiscal policy, the Chinese state derived its autonomy largely
from the ‘historical dividend’—China’s long centralized state tradition had given
local governments little basis or means to resist a policy change even when the
change would definitely hurt their interests. This, of course, is not to say that the local
governments were completely passive vis-a`-vis the central state’s decision. After the
installation of the tax sharing system, many local governments, especially those in the
poor regions, faced serious financial difficulties. This compelled local officials to tax
farmers more heavily, and to attract outside investment and generate income from
land sales. The new tax sharing system, therefore, greatly boosted the development of
foreign and joint venture companies and the rise of China’s housing market. At the
same time, it also created environmental problems, induced frequent land disputes
and gave rise to countless protests provoked by these developments.
42. Coase and Wang, How China Became Capitalist.
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The privatization of the state-owned industry was another reform of great
consequence in this period.43 The reform altogether removed the state’s burden to
subsidize a huge amount of small- and medium-size state-owned companies that
could no longer be saved. In the process, most of the state property was siphoned
away by those Chinese who had power and connections or even by foreign
companies. Yet, the whole process, as wicked as it was, did no harm to the overall
performance of the economy because those who had taken over the state-owned
enterprises were often able to use them to produce better products at lower cost. The
process did, however, create a moral outcry and triggered the re-emergence of leftist
ideologies in China. Most importantly, millions of workers in state-owned industries
lost their jobs in the process. Very frequent and sometimes violent protests by the
laid-off workers and military veterans (who were assigned jobs in state-owned
factories after demobilization but soon lost those jobs as the factories closed down)
became headaches that the Chinese government had to face for many years to come.
In this period, the rural collective industry, which has been regarded by some
scholars as the key to economic success, declined and then disappeared. The age of
rural collective industry had passed, but China’s economy gathered greater
momentum. This again proves our argument that ‘the success of China’s economy
never hinges on any one of the state policies’. Wei Pan, a leftist scholar, argues that
the rural collective industry collapsed largely because China’s neoliberal
policymakers saw it as an obstacle to privatization and, therefore, were determined
to end its existence.44 We argue that, while ideology was indeed somehow behind the
disappearance of the rural collective industry, it was not the main reason. Back in the
1980s, the rural collective industry was very positively regarded because it exhibited
a vitality that state-owned industries did not have. Yet, in the mid-1990s, the rural
collective industry, due to its low value-added technology and traditional styles of
management, became increasingly unable to compete with foreign or joint ventures
or even with burgeoning private companies. Another state policy was also
instrumental to the disappearance of the rural collective industry: as China’s state-
owned banks started market-oriented reforms in 1993, it became increasingly harder
for the rural collective industries to obtain cheap loans from the banks through the
local governments that no longer relied as much on the revenue from the rural
collective industries as before due to the rise of alternative revenue sources from
foreign companies, joint ventures, private businesses and even land sales. Many rural
collective enterprises were bankrupted because their capital flows discontinued.
What we want to stress here is that no ‘anti-rural collective industry conspiracy’
existed among China’s top policymakers at the time. China’s reform policies were
never as coherent as Pan imagined.
The reform in the 1990s was also carried out in a more ‘friendly’ sociopolitical
context: (1) the 1989 repression forced many dissidents out of China and silenced the
voices of ‘liberal’ intellectuals; (2) the shift of political winds after Deng’s southern
43. Yang Yao, ‘Privatizing the small SOEs’, in Ross Garnaut and Ligang Song, eds, China’s Third Economic
Transformation: The Rise of the Private Economy (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), ch. 7.
44. Wei Pan, Nongmin yu Shichang: Zhongguo Jiceng Zhengquan yu Xiangzheng Qiye [Farmers and Market—
China’s Grassroots Political Authority and the Township and Village Enterprises ] (Beijing: Commercial Press,
2003).
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China tour silenced leftists, which meant that the forces that could potentially give
support to China’s underprivileged population were also silenced; (3) with the rise of
the market, the lives of the Chinese people became much less determined by the
policy of the central state. In other words, the social problems and people’s
grievances to a certain degree were localized and depoliticized; and (4) the Chinese
people were still enjoying the newly achieved affluence and had not yet developed a
very strong sense of rights and entitlement as they have now. Together, these
structural conditions granted the state great autonomy, minimized the ‘collective
action problems’ induced by interest group politics or/and social protests, and
contributed to the ‘ten golden years’ of the Chinese economy.
Social policy-oriented development: 2003
Yet, while the reform in the 1990s brought a booming economy and greatly improved
the living standard of the Chinese as a whole, the negative unintended consequences
of the reform (including income disparities, official corruption, the collapse of the
public welfare and health system, massive layoff of workers, tax burden of farmers,
land appropriation and forced relocation, environmental degradation) also developed
quickly. According to state statistics, incidents that can be regarded as collective
actions reached 10,000 in 1994, 20,000 in 1998 and 40,000 in 2000. In 2005,
collective action incidents had reached 87,000 occurrences.45 By 2002, when Hu
Jingtao and Wen Jiabao became China’s new leaders, the negative unintended
consequences of the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s had become very serious.
It is without doubt that the kind of protests mentioned above will create serious
‘collective action problems’, increase production costs and prevent further economic
development. Yet, against all these odds, the Chinese economy has still maintained a
high-speed development in a time when the world economy has experienced a
prolonged downturn. We argue that what is behind China’s current high-speed
development is not the economic policy but the social policy. Confronted with these
problems, the Hu–Wen administration turned its attention to social policies to ease
the tensions caused by earlier reform policies. This is the so-called ‘Hu–Wen New
Deal’. The ‘New Deal’ has, to a certain degree, lowered the occupational and regional
income disparities and alleviated social tension, and created a stable environment for
further economic growth. On the other hand, the ‘New Deal’ has created its own
unintended consequences that are now looming large.
The Hu–Wen New Deal has two legs—social policies and government spending
on infrastructural projects. While the social policies have provided the ‘changing
society’ with a ‘political stability’,46 the government spending, together with a
favorable environment created by China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, has sustained
China’s high-speed development in the last ten years.
Among the social policies that have been implemented by the Chinese
government, the following are particularly significant: (1) in 2003, the government
began to establish a rural cooperative medical system that has by now covered most
45. Andrew C. Mertha, ‘Society in the state: China’s nondemocratic political pluralization’, in Stanley Rosen and
Peter Hays Gries, eds, State and Society in 21st Century China (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 2–3.
46. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
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rural areas; (2) in 2004, the government significantly lowered the agricultural tax and
started to provide subsidies for agricultural production. Farming is no longer an
unattractive business as it was before; (3) in 2005, the government initiated an
appliance subsidy program in rural areas. By now, big screen TVs, refrigerators and
microwaves are commonplace even in remote rural areas; (4) since 2005, the
government has spent heavily to construct paved roads in villages; (5) in 2006, the
government passed legislation to enforce nine-years of free education, which has
since then been rigorously implemented; and (6) in 2007, the government passed the
labor contract law, which has played a decisive role in pushing up the wages of
China’s lowest income sectors several times since then.
Government spending has also become a major engine of economic growth. The
infrastructural projects, such as airports and train stations, highways, and high-speed
trains, have not only facilitated the travel of the Chinese people, but have also greatly
lowered the transaction costs of business activities and stimulated the development of
many industries. The government’s appliance subsidy programs have for many years
sustained the development of several related industries while world demands have
sharply declined. Finally, capital from various state sectors has continuously found its
way into China’s booming housing market over the last ten years. Together with the
money from China’s ever expanding middle class, the money has significantly
boosted China’s housing market.
Yet, these new policies and developments carry their own unintended
consequences as well. The ‘New Deal’ made people increasingly reliant upon the
government. Consequently, Chinese interest, rather than being expressed in the form
of interest group politics, is developed into a kind of poorly organized and
emotionally charged populist politics. In the presence of the rising tide of protests, the
Chinese government has only one effective method of containment, that is, to
appease people with money.47 This strategy channels social grievances in a direction
that is impossible to institutionalize. Riots and protests have increased at a time when
people’s lives have actually undergone huge and general improvement.
The rise of populist politics has also created conditions for a quick re-emergence of
leftist ideologies, and allowed some ambitious politicians and ideologues to tap into
people’s populist mentality for personal political gain, which not only undermines the
autonomy of the central state but also adds uncertainties to Chinese politics. What Bo
Xilai and his intellectual followers were doing in Chongqing for the past few years,
and the huge impact they have created, is very much facilitated by the populist nature
of the ‘New Deal’.
The government-spending driven economic development has also created its own
problems. In the past ten years, such a proactive fiscal policy has greatly raised the
status of large-scale state-owned firms, weakened the roles of the market and private
businesses in the economy, and induced massive poor-return investment. The rising
state power and the power of those people who have benefited from the recent state
policies have invited criticisms from liberal-minded intellectuals and created massive
grievances against the privileged people. Moreover, the development of
47. Dingxin Zhao, ‘Mincui Zhengzhi—Zhongguo Chongtu Zhengzhi de Zouxiang’ [‘Populism politics—the
trend of China’s contentious politics’], Lingdaozhe [Leader ] 20, (February 2008), pp. 42–49.
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infrastructural projects has passed its peak and cannot contribute as much to the GDP
as before. China’s further development depends increasingly on whether or not China
is able to have a successful transition from the labor intensive, environment
unfriendly development model to a capital intensive, technology-driven model.
China’s state revenue has increased very quickly thanks to the superb economic
performance. However, the state has started to run small budget deficits in recent years
due to its huge spending onwelfare provision and infrastructural projects. The Chinese
government will surely face a hard time if the economy hits a major crisis. We,
however, do not want to predict ‘the coming collapse of China’. Scholars have
frequentlymade this kind of ‘prediction’ based on different logics ever since the 1980s,
but theCCP has been able to retain its power and the economy has grown continuously.
China has not developed according to those ominous predictions largely thanks to the
nature of the Chinese state: the state’s performance-based legitimacy compels
the government to keep its focus on promoting economic development and makes the
government very cautious in dealing with grievances and protests, and the Chinese
state’s autonomy has given the government a great capacity to launch new reforms
when the negative unintended consequences of old reformmeasures become apparent.
We are certain that China’s new leaders will implement different policies. The
problem, however, is that good government policies will raise people’s desire and
demand and bad policies will induce state-centered grievances. Regardless of how
the state actually performs, it is going to face increasingly difficult challenges. Yet, it
might be hard for a linear thinker to understand that such challenges are also the very
secret behind China’s economic success.
Conclusion
S. E. Finer has attributed the rise of the West to the existence of an unstable
institutional arrangement in pre-modern Europe. He argues that while the great Asian
civilizations all ‘had reached the condition with which they were quite consciously
satisfied and from which they did not wish to move’, Europe ‘from the fall of the
Western Roman Empire’ ‘was always restless, uncomfortable with itself’.48 What
Finer means is that the medieval European elite—kings, aristocracies, priests and
later the bourgeois—could never reach a stabilized power balance and were always in
a state of conflict and restlessness. By the eighteenth century, the restlessness had
spread to all spheres of European society as never before. Modern industrial
capitalism and the nation state stumbled upon us exactly because of this never
stabilized institutional arrangement. Applying this Finerian insight to understand
modern China, we can immediately see that China’s economic success lies also in the
restlessness of the Chinese society partly induced by the Chinese state’s
performance-based legitimacy. Performance-based legitimacy gives the Chinese
government and people a perpetual sense of crisis, on the one hand, and the Chinese
society a great tension and rare kind of energy, on the other hand. This tension can
lead to economic breakthrough as well as state breakdown.
48. Samuel E. Finer, The History of Government from the Earliest Times (vols 1–3) (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997), pp. 1473–1475.
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